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Abstract 
Microfinance non-financial services have been recently reformulated as high quality 
demand-led programs. In the Mexican context, these are now voluntary, can have a cost for 
the borrower and are frequently supplied in partnership with specialized public or private 
agencies. Using primary data from a survey of clients of two credit-plus programs in 
Chiapas, this paper examines and compares the participation determinants and added impact 
of the training sessions on monetary poverty outcomes of the borrowers. We focus on two 
specific programs: Business Development Services and Preventive Health Services. Results 
suggest that the participation decision mainly depends on borrowers’ characteristics. Non-
financial services are found to reduce the clients’ likelihood of being under the asset poverty 
line. No significant differences were observed between the impacts of the two non-financial 
programs. 
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1. Introduction 
Microfinance’s achievements in poverty reduction have been celebrated worldwide. These 
schemes have proved to be a successful adaptation to imperfect credit markets. By supplying 
small loans to low income people with little or no collateral, microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) have relaxed the constraints on the poor’s access to productive capital and, 
consequently, contributed to break the vicious circle of poverty caused by low income and 
subsequent low investments.  
However, in recent years, a sequence of repayment crises in countries such as Morocco, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and India (Andhra Pradesh) has contributed to the increased scrutiny of 
the sector. The effectiveness of microfinance as a poverty alleviation tool has started to be 
questioned by many practitioners who have reconsidered the argument that microfinance per 
se needs to be combined with other non-financial actions to effectively improve the 
livelihoods of clients (Lanao-Flores and Serres, 2009). Indeed, the opening lines of the 
Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2011 read: Microcredit is a tool for unlocking human 
dreams. But microcredit, by itself, is usually not enough (Reed, 2011).  
But not every MFI has been delivering microcredit by itself. Practitioners with strong pro-
poor positioning, mostly operating group lending methodologies, such as ProMujer, FINCA 
(Foundation for International Community Assistance) or BRAC (Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee), have been implementing successful integrated programs where 
credit is linked to education and other non-financial services (NFS) for the past few decades.  
Delivered in conjunction with microfinance products, these ‘plus’ programs are widely 
heterogeneous. A simplified categorization classifies them in (1) social related services 
including, among others, health education, maternal and child healthcare, literacy, language 
training, legal advice and different kinds of personal mentoring and (2) microentrepreneurial 
development services, involving financial, business and vocational training and technical 
assistance.  
NFS aim to improve the returns to borrowers’ investments. The awareness of crucial health 
and business practices issues is thought to multiply the return on the capital which MFIs 
provide, thus, contributing to increase the likelihood that the loans effectively reduce 
poverty. Similarly, credit-plus has been found to diminish the risk of the loan being diverted 
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from productive to consumption activities due to, for example, external shocks, and to 
reduce the likelihood of default (Marconi and Mosley, 2006).  
After a period of unpopularity of non-financial services among the main stakeholders in the 
industry (Yunus, 1999), international and local NGOs, such as Freedom from Hunger, as 
well as governmental social departments have contributed to reformulate the concept and 
take advantage of the MFIs’ economies of scope. Different partnership arrangements 
involving a variety of actors have given rise to the development and implementation of an 
increasing number of high-quality demand-led NFS available to microfinance clients. 
Empirical evidence of the impact of NFS is limited in development economics research 
(Armendariz and Morduch, 2005). This is mainly due to the lack of data that would allow 
for a reliable estimation of the added value of these programs, accounting for endogenous 
participation and program placement biases. First, this paper explores the demand and 
supply side characteristics that determine borrower participation in voluntary NFS and, 
hence, it estimates the marginal impact of two types of credit-plus programs, i.e. preventive 
health training and business development services, on monetary poverty outcomes of 
participants. We estimate this relationship from primary data collected in Chiapas, Mexico, 
from a survey of 434 households.  
In this paper, the impact of NFS is estimated following a double differences or ‘difference-
in-difference’ econometric approach. This method removes endogeneity biases related to 
different permanent characteristics between the participant and non-participant groups as 
well as between the eligible and would-be-eligible groups. The study additionally 
contributes to further explain the underlying relationship between human and social capital, 
which conditions the determinants of participation as well as the impact of NFS. 
Furthermore, though NFS are thought to be especially relevant in countries where the 
delivery of public human capital services has failed, no empirical study has yet considered 
their existence. This is especially relevant in Mexico where the well-known poverty 
alleviation program Oportunidades, previously known as PROGRESA, is being 
implemented. This co-responsibility program, which combines poverty alleviation and social 
protection policies, gives grants to poor female household heads on the condition that they 
provide schooling for their children, make periodic visits to health clinics and attend 
educational workshops on issues such as health, nutrition or domestic violence. In this study, 
we identify unexplored synergies between the Oportunidades program and the MFIs’ non-
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financial activities. We find evidence of NFS impact on poverty alleviation for the less poor 
clients within the sample, i.e. those around the asset poverty line, but no significant 
differences appear to exist between the impacts of the two programs for any of the 
outcomes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical and 
empirical background. Section 3 addresses the methodology. Survey design and data are 
described in Section 4. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical findings and Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Background 
Microfinance in Chiapas is a fast-growing industry concentrating more than half of the MFIs 
with reported activity in Mexico
1
. Chiapas is one of the poorest and more deprived Mexican 
States and competition in the microfinance scene has become fierce in some municipalities. 
Similarly, the extreme levels of deprivation and dissident past of this state have jointly 
motivated the implementation of several public poverty alleviation programs and ensured 
the presence of numerous national and international development agencies and 
organizations.  
In the early days of microfinance practically all MFIs supplied to their borrowers 
compulsory training and education programs. However, during the 1990s, the increasing 
pressure from donors such as USAID to specialize in microfinance activities and concentrate 
on financial sustainability, contributed to phase out many of these integrated microfinance 
projects (Goldmark, 2006). Since then, efforts have increasingly focused on cost-effectively 
overcoming the rigidities and inefficiencies of the first-generation ‘credit-plus’ models and 
creating links between the borrowers and the service providers in order to enhance 
microfinance’s impact (Sievers and Vandenberg, 2007). As a consequence, NFS have been 
substantially improved. Mexican MFIs, in which this process has been stimulated by 
competition, have succeeded in considerably reducing the main disadvantages of bundled 
human capital products. On the demand side, attending compulsory time-consuming training 
sessions reduced the clients’ time for productive or commercial activities. Consequently, 
 
1
 An updated panorama of the microfinance sector in Mexico can be found in the Mexican microfinance 
network’s website: www.prodesarrollo.org and in www.mixmarket.org 
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NFS are no longer compulsory and, in most cases, are delivered at a subsidized cost for the 
borrower. On the supply side, an organizational transformation has taken place. The NFS 
programs are currently jointly designed and/or delivered with public or private partners, 
avoiding the problems of a lack of specialization and ensuring the quality of both services. 
Strengthening the effect of microfinance on poverty reduction outcomes continues to be the 
main objective of these additional training and education components. However, different 
types of NFS have been devised for that aim. 
The academic literature does not present clear evidence that NFS contribute to poverty 
alleviation objectives. McKernan (2002) is responsible for a pioneer study aiming to gauge 
the separate impact of non-financial program aspects using cross-sectional data of over one 
thousand households that received microcredit in Bangladesh. Her aim was to disentangle 
which part of the positive effects of microfinance was exclusively due to the loan and which 
to the other procedures used in group lending methodologies. She finds positive non-credit 
effects in self-employment profits of borrowers. Smith (2002), in his impact analysis of 
health training on the expenditure levels of Project HOPE’s borrowers in Ecuador and 
Honduras, finds mixed results. Similarly, Karlan and Valdivia (2011) find no significant 
positive impact of a Peruvian business development program on key outcomes of FINCA 
borrowers, such as business revenues and profits. However, both of these last studies do find 
positive added impact of NFS on specific objectives of the training programs such as 
breastfeeding or business practices, respectively. 
Theoretically, the contributions of business development services (BDS) and preventive 
health services (PHS) to poverty reduction through an increase in household income are 
differently channelled. BDS aim to teach basic skills to improve business performance. 
Topics such as defining capital and investment, where to buy and sell, how to set prices, 
investment, credit sales, etc. are reviewed during the modules. Improvements in these areas 
should increase business related outcomes such as revenues, profits, etc. The direct 
relationship of training with labour productivity and household income is immediate (see, 
for example, Schultz 1988).   
PHS intend to raise health-consciousness, improve preventive health practices and increase 
the utilization of formal healthcare. There is evidence that better health status increases 
effective labour supply and raises productivity, reducing the incidence of illness and the 
number of workdays lost. The importance of health and nutrition as determinants of 
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productivity and earnings in poor countries is well established (Strauss and Thomas, 1995). 
Additionally, encouraging the participation in formal healthcare and strengthening the 
liaisons between public and private health programs reduces household health expenditure 
and exposure to external shocks. This contributes to preventing the use of coping strategies 
such as selling productive assets which increase households’ vulnerability (Mosley, 2001).  
Thus, as a consequence of BDS and PHS, household income rises. In turn, this additional 
income increases investment possibilities in high return physical assets and human capital. It 
will also prevent credit default, which will improve credit access and strengthen social 
capital in the credit groups. Consequently, the household will reduce its likelihood of being 
below the poverty line.  
3. Methodology 
Selection bias and endogenous program placement are the major constraints to be addressed 
when aiming to measure the causal impacts that programs such as NFS have on participants. 
These are the main causes for biased estimates in impact assessments. Selection bias occurs 
when unobserved characteristics that determine the participation decision in NFS correlate 
with the outcome of interest. For example, unmeasured female empowerment might be an 
important determinant of participation in NFS programs. It is not rare that clients’ partners 
or parents forbid participation, as it involves spending time outside the household or being 
examined by male doctors. These unobservable characteristics will also be correlated with, 
for instance, an outcome such as business revenues which will increase when the client has 
no constraints to sell outside the household. Endogeneity bias can also arise from the 
placement of programs. Placement of social programs is seldom random, depending on both 
supply and demand side factors. For example, MFIs would most probably tend to supply 
auxiliary services only to the poorer areas. If better-off areas are used as a control group for 
impact assessment, endogeneity would bias the impact coefficient.  
To obtain unbiased estimates of an intervention, we need to consider a system of equations. 
While the structural equation accounts for the program impact (equation 1), the reduced 
form one determines the probability of participation (equation 2).  
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        (1) 
         (2) 
where Yij is the outcome of interest (income or being below the poverty line); Tij is a binary 
variable that equals 1 if the individual i in municipality j receives the treatment; Xij is a 
vector of observed household and municipality characteristics (such as age, education, 
ethnicity, etc.); T, Y, Y are the parameters to be estimated, where Y is the parameter that 
measures the impact of the program; and ij and ij are the idiosyncratic error terms. 
Endogeneity occurs when these error terms are correlated.  
Karlan and Valdivia (2011) overcame these problems by randomly assigning individuals 
into treatment and control groups. This balanced the heterogeneity of participants and non-
participants’ characteristics. However, these types of randomized trials are complicated to 
replicate when working with MFIs or MFIs’ sponsors that have poverty alleviation as their 
main objective, as these are frequently regarded as unethical. Additionally, social 
experiments are difficult to control and the integrity of the data, which ensures unbiased 
estimation, can be easily affected during the course of the experiment by attrition, spill-over 
effects or non-compliance problems.  
Following Pitt and Khandker (1998), quasi-experimental cross-section set-ups like this one 
have frequently used instrumental variables to rule out selection bias. An example for this in 
the Mexican context is Niño-Zarazua (2009). Eligibility criteria have been traditionally used 
as instruments but this is problematic in the case of NFS programs as, in practice, there are 
many exceptions to these rules.  
To assess the average effect of the treatment on the treated, we conducted a special survey 
that takes advantage of the design and progressive supply of NFS. Following Coleman 
(1999; 2006), two groups of borrowers were initially identified. The first group was eligible 
to receive the credit-plus programs and participants and non-participants could be observed 
in it. The second group was not currently eligible to participate in NFS but was about to be 
given access and the groups of would-be participants and non-participants had already been 
formed by the MFIs. The ineligible group was used as a control group, presenting the 
additional advantage that the selection process could also be observed in it.  
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This special setup allows us to control for the endogeneity bias that derives from self-
selection by including the observable characteristics that determine participation as a proxy 
for non-observable features. Especially in the case in which non-random program placement 
bias may be a larger problem, BDS, we eliminate the possible endogeneity by interviewing 
clients in the areas that are going to be given access to NFS in the near future. The special 
survey design, presented in the next section, also allowed us to estimate the determinants of 
participation in non-financial services using a probit model.  
The appropriate identification strategy for this approach is double difference or difference-
in-difference (DD) estimation. Two groups  experience different outcomes Y if 
they meet or not specific eligibility criteria . Y
NFS
 is the outcome in presence of 
the non-financial services treatment and Y
NNFS
 is the outcome in the absence of the 
treatment. Group S is the self-selected group willing to participate in NFS, group Ns is the 
non self-selected group unwilling to attend NFS, A is the eligible group that can already 
access the treatment and Na is the group without access, i.e. not yet eligible. Treatment is 
only observed if g=S and e=A, i.e. we can only observe the treatment if borrowers are 
willing to participate in NFS, S=1, and already have eligible status A=1. The treatment 
effect on the treated for a linear and uncensored outcome can be identified as follows:  
  (3) 
In a functional form, the model is estimated as follows: 
     (4) 
where each outcome Y for the client i in municipality j is regressed on a set of household and 
municipality characteristics Xij, an indicator of access to participate Aij, a binary variable for 
self-selection into participant status Sij, and the treatment dummy Tij, which is identified as 
the interaction term (AijSij). In this set-up the observable and unobservable characteristics 
that determine interest in participating are captured by Sij. The access dummy Aij captures 
aggregate factors that would cause changes in Yij even in the absence of a treatment.  
This specification assumes that there are no spill-over effects between participants and non-
participants in the eligible group. Hamid et al. (2010) proved that these were a major 
problem when evaluating the impact of Grameen Bank’s micro-insurance program in 
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Bangladesh. In the present study, qualitative evidence supports this assumption
2
. To 
maximise the returns to the training, BDS is designed to attract every possible member of a 
group in which the training is being delivered. Though the decision to attend is ultimately 
made at an individual level, almost every borrower of a centre in which classes are being 
delivered actually participates. Different centres rarely have contact with each other so that 
there is no major exchange of information between participants and non-participants. 
Additionally, the borrowers are running similar businesses in the same area which prevents 
them from sharing valuable information with others. In the case of PHS, evidence is strong 
that the information spill-over is very limited. Participants are not comfortable speaking to 
others about the health campaigns because sexually transmitted diseases and human 
papilloma virus are considered social taboos. Consultores de Servicios Varios 
(CONSERVA), the MFI responsible for supplying PHS, gives the opportunity to take 
relatives to the training but as health checks are not subsidized for them, they either visit 
other public or private clinics or decide not to be screened.  
While this model controls for non-random program placement by using municipalities in 
which the program is in the pipeline, it does not necessarily control for the order in which 
the program is delivered. If this order is randomly assigned with respect to observed and 
unobserved municipality characteristics, then the estimates obtained considering these 
characteristics as regressors will be unbiased. On the contrary, if the order is not random and 
the vector of municipality characteristics is not enough to proxy municipality specific 
unobservable characteristics, endogeneity can be eliminated using a municipality-level fixed 
effects technique (FE). However, if municipality unobservable features are not correlated 
with the regressors, performing FE estimation might be costly in terms of efficiency as the 
variance of the FE estimator is always larger than that of the non-FE estimator. Additionally, 
since the sample size is not large, parameter estimates using the FE specification might be 
imprecisely estimated
3
. The Hausman test statistic has been designed to test if FE estimates 
significantly differ from the models with municipality characteristics and is described as:  
,     (5) 
 
2
 Transcripts are available upon request from the author.  
3
 Heckman (1981) argues that unbiased, in the case of uncensored dependent variables, or consistent, for 
censored dependent variables, estimates can be achieved with more than seven observations per fixed effect 
unit. In our regressions, the average per unit is 20. 
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This test was attempted but, as it frequently occurs with survey data, the covariance matrix 
of the difference of the covariance matrices of the parameter estimates, , was 
not positive definite and the test was undefined. Following Coleman (1999) and Pitt and 
Khandker (1998), an alternative test was applied. First, the fixed effects (FE) were 
estimated. Hence, these were regressed on the non-fixed effects model, including the 
municipality variable, to establish if the FE and the regressors were correlated. Finally, an F-
test or chi-squared test evaluated the joint significance of the independent regressors in this 
auxiliary model. The results of this test reveal that FE estimators are more efficient for every 
regression performed in this paper as the null hypothesis of zero correlation between 
independent variables and municipality fixed effects is rejected in every case. Non-FE 
equations yield biased or inconsistent estimates due to the existence of unobservable 
municipality characteristics, i.e. the municipalities have not randomly accessed the NFS 
programs.   
An extended version of model 4 is used to distinguish the added impact of each program 
after between one and two years of operation. The binary variables for access Aij, self-
selection Sij, and treatment Tij are replaced in equation 6 as follows:  
  (6) 
where A1ij, S1ij, and T1ij are access, self-selection and treatment coefficients for the BDS 
program, and A2ij, S2ij, and T2ij are equivalent for the PHS treatment, respectively. B
measures the impact of attending BDS and H of the PHS program. F-tests are performed to 
determine if there are significant differences in the impact of the two different treatments on 
the outcome of interest (B =H).  
4. Data and survey design 
We conducted a cross-sectional survey of 434 clients of the Mexican MFIs, AlSol and 
CONSERVA, during 2009. AlSol and CONSERVA were the only two MFIs operating 
mature non-financial programs in Chiapas at that time. Both celebrated their tenth 
anniversary in 2009 and their credit programs share multiple characteristics. However, their 
NFS are differently structured and implemented. AlSol has been providing BDS since May 
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2008 in a program jointly designed with Freedom from Hunger
4
. BDS participants received 
between 30 to 45 minutes of biweekly entrepreneurship training during the credit meetings.  
CONSERVA has been supplying since 2006 voluntary health education sessions with 
partially subsidized preventive healthcare services to clients of the financial program who 
exceed three credit cycles. Mainly designed and operated by GEMA, a local NGO primarily 
financed by CONSERVA, the services are delivered by staff members and local private 
clinics and the training materials have been developed by psychology scholars of the 
Chiapas Autonomous University (UNACH). Eligible participants are informed of the health 
campaign dates and asked to book their training by paying its full price in advance. They 
attend a day of activities, including an hour and a half seminar on women’s health, public 
question sessions with staff, cancer screening and colposcopy exam, and an additional 
detailed private explanation of the results by the NGO staff. In case a treatment is needed, 
which in our sample happened in more than 50% of the cases, patients are entitled to two 
more subsidized medical visits, receive financial advice to cope with medication costs and 
are helped to be redirected to the public social system. The multiple links with 
Oportunidades, have led to cooperative agreements with the local social services 
governmental departments, which represents an advantage for the clients as well as for the 
public health services. The key characteristics of the non-financial programs of these MFIs 
are described in Appendix 1. 
Implementation of NFS in these institutions allowed for a special survey design following 
that of Coleman (1999, 2006). For both programs, a control group of clients that would gain 
access to the program could be identified. At the time of the survey, BDS had been 
progressively incorporated in six out of the eight AlSol branches. The two last branches did 
not have NFS yet but the clients had already been given the chance to decide if they would 
participate and groups had already been formed. In CONSERVA, the clients interviewed 
were those in their third credit cycle so that those willing to participate had already paid for 
their PHS session.  
The sampling was stratified by access criteria
5
. For AlSol, branches were stratified 
according to whether the program was supplied since it started or was not supplied at all. 
 
4
 Since 1989, this international NGO runs the flagship Credit with Education project, implementing it with 
local partners around the globe. 
5
 The weights of participants and non-participants coincide with those of the real distribution so the use of 
sampling weights is not necessary.  
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The branches in which the program had been running for less than a year were eliminated 
from consideration. Yajalon branch was randomly selected and, to ensure that the treatment 
area was similar to the control, Ocosingo branch, in the adjacent municipality and former 
capture area of the Yajalon branch, was purposively selected. For CONSERVA, the two 
branches in the capital city, Tuxtla Gutierrez, were selected. These branches, with activity in 
municipalities up to six hours away, had split off from an original branch in which the non-
financial program had started. The clients in these branches were stratified according to 
whether they had completed three cycles or more. Then, a random sample of lending groups 
was selected from the eligibility strata of both institutions. Finally, the clients from these 
groups were randomly selected.  
This primary data was collected through standardized structured questionnaires and 
complemented with secondary supply side data from the MFIs’ databases. Respondents of 
the survey were the microfinance clients. The overall response rate was 76 percent
6
. The 
actual enrolment in the training sessions among the borrowers surveyed was 65 percent. The 
willingness to participate in the non-eligible group was 71 percent.  
A table containing descriptive statistics of the variables used in these regressions is 
presented in Appendix 2. 
5. Results 
We discuss in this section the determinants of participation in non-financial services and the 
impact that participation has on household monthly income per capita
7
 and on the 
probability of being below the poverty line.    
5.1. Participation 
The special survey design allows us to analyze the demand for human capital by 
microfinance borrowers. Table 1 presents the probit estimations of the participation 
 
6
 Illness or death of household members was the main reason for non response. To control for absenteeism to 
the credit meetings, every group was visited a minimum of two times. Additionally, visits to the house or 
workplace of repeatedly absent clients were scheduled.  
7
 Household income is preferred to expenditure as it is the measure that both MFIs had collected on their 
databases. Similarly, income is used by CONEVAL (2009) to estimate the Mexican poverty lines. 
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determinants in NFS. In this model, the dependent variable is a binary indicator which 
equals one if the client has already attended the program or is interested in participating and 
zero otherwise. Firstly, to test how clients’ socio-economic characteristics, as well as 
business and NFS program features affect the likelihood of participating in NFS, a model 
including the full sample is estimated. Secondly, we conduct separate regression analyses 
for each of the NFS programs, BDS and PHS, to observe the differences between the types 
of training. Finally, to control for the potential endogeneity of some variables that might 
have been affected by the services, we run identical regressions for the non-eligible groups 
only. All the models are jointly significant and robust to goodness of fit and model 
specification post estimation procedures.  
Our findings suggest that the participation decision appears to be more attributable to the 
socio-economic characteristics of the borrowers than to those of their businesses or NFS 
program features, e.g. distance to training. This implies that taking into account the 
borrowers’ characteristics during the design process is crucial for the success of NFS 
programs. Equally important is to select the type of voluntary NFS that is going to be 
implemented according to the characteristics of the target population because, as expected, 
business and health related NFS attract different types of borrowers. Most of the results are 
not robust when using only the groups without access to NFS, but this might be a 
consequence of the limited sample size.  
Two specific borrowers’ attributes appear to be particularly important as participation 
determinants in NFS, their effects being robust to the use of the control group regression. 
First, an interesting result is that those clients who had received or were receiving the 
Oportunidades program at the moment of the interview were significantly more likely to 
participate in NFS. The Oportunidades’ workshops are the only other courses in any topic 
that the interviewees had attended to during the last two years. According to these findings, 
NFS and Oportunidades’ training sessions are complementary, which has important 
implications for policy design. Our findings support the idea that receiving this 
governmental program will encourage participation in other types of training and education 
activities (Sosa-Rubí et al., 2009). Second, a higher ratio of female human capital adjusted 
by the education of all the working members in the household appears to significantly lower 
the intentions to participate in NFS. This result, contradictory to the literature, suggests that 
the clients living in households in which female working members have higher levels of 
education are less likely to participate in NFS. We can argue that this is probably a 
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consequence of the basic nature of the courses, designed to attract those who need them 
most, and of the higher opportunity costs of attendance if women in the household have 
worthy jobs. This seems to be particularly true in the case of BDS, which appears to drive 
the findings. When the two kinds of NFS are considered separately, only the results for the 
full sample of BDS (III) are significant at any conventional level, and though female human 
capital in the household has been found to increase the likelihood of participating in cervical 
cancer screening in Mexico (Lazcano-Ponce et al., 2002), our results for PHS participation 
are close to zero and not significant. 
As expected, if BDS and PHS are considered separately, the individual and household 
characteristics associated with willingness to participate vary substantially from one type of 
service to the other. In the case of BDS, no determinants are robust to both the full sample 
and control groups. However, those that are significant at any conventional level for one of 
the groups are mainly individual characteristics of the borrowers such as levels of 
empowerment, deprivation or house ownership, thus unrelated to the clients’ business or 
program features.  
Robust determinants for participation in PHS are being older, more educated and not owning 
a house. Age and education positively and significantly determine the willingness to 
undertake PHS training, which is consistent with the literature on the determinants for adult 
education and access to cervical screening in developing countries (Nene et al., 2007). In 
comparison with PHS, the mixed and insignificant results obtained for BDS might suggest 
that completed education of the clients also affects the type of training in which the 
borrower decides to engage (Blundell et al., 1996), i.e. women with more years of completed 
education are more likely to opt for health related services. House ownership negatively 
affects the likelihood of participating in PHS, though this result is positive for BDS it is only 
significant for the full sample estimation. A plausible explanation for these findings might 
be that while the BDS course requires continuous attendance, entailing high opportunity 
costs in terms of time for those that have more unstable sources of income, PHS is an 
occasional service that does not require constant dedication (Winkler et al., 2008).  
For indigenous people the likelihood of participating is positive and significant at 1 per cent 
for the NFS control group (II). This variable was dropped from the PHS models because, 
due to the limited presence of indigenous peoples among CONSERVA’s clients, it perfectly 
predicted non-participation in the full sample regressions (V) and willingness to participate 
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in the case of the control group (VI). These last results probably drive the positive and 
significant association between being indigenous and participating that can be observed for 
the control group of NFS (II). Even if subject to data limitations and though the positive 
results for BDS are not significant, the fact that these findings clearly contradict the existing 
literature makes them relevant. There are two plausible explanations for this. Indigenous 
people in Mexico live in rural areas and are the main target of welfare programs, which 
appear to positively affect the likelihood of participating. More importantly, Skoufias et al. 
(2009) discusses the importance of social networks, especially in Mexican rural areas, in 
human capital and economic decisions of indigenous people. Though the debate continues 
on whether social capital is built or destroyed by microfinance institutions, this might 
indicate, as in Mosley et al. (2004) that credit groups provide a previously non-existent 
social network which might positively affect participation in NFS of indigenous people.  
Other results indicate that being the household head has a positive and significant effect on 
participation in BDS, which similarly occurs for NFS, though the findings are not robust 
when only the control groups are used. This may suggest that the clients are more likely to 
consider themselves as household heads as a consequence of the training. Similarly, high 
levels of deprivation are found to be negatively associated with willingness to participate in 
NFS and, both in BDS and PHS, though these results are only significant for the groups that 
have already been made eligible to receive the programs. Again, it is possible that this 
happens as a consequence of receiving the treatment, implying that NFS contribute to reduce 
the deprivation levels of the borrowers. The deprivation index is based on CONEVAL 
(2009) and measured as the satisfaction of basic needs in housing quality (materials and 
overcrowding), basic services (piped water, electricity, sewage and gas oven) and health 
services (availability of health insurance). It ranges from 0 to 3, where 3 is the maximum 
level of deprivation. 
5.2. Impact 
Both types of NFS, health and business, might have added effects on monetary poverty 
outcomes of the clients. Channeled through higher revenues, profits and better productivity, 
BDS might increase household income and the probability of being above the poverty line. 
Similarly, PHS might, through a higher health status, increase labour supply and business 
productivity while reducing long run health expenditure and exposure to health shocks.  
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NFS effects on the natural logarithm of monthly net household income per capita
8
 are 
estimated using OLS.  The probability of being under the three
9
 official Mexican poverty 
lines will be estimated using a binary logit model where living below the poverty line =1 
and living above the poverty line =0. The poverty lines, estimated by CONEVAL (2009) in 
Mexican Pesos for August 2009
10
, assign monetary values to basic food and non-food 
baskets. The food poverty line is derived by estimating the per capita income levels required 
to purchase a basic food basket with the minimum nutritional requirements for a healthy 
living, in urban and rural contexts
11
. The capabilities poverty line includes the costs of 
healthcare and formal education. Finally, the asset poverty line captures a moderate degree 
of deprivation by estimating the level of income necessary to purchase the basic food basket 
plus other non-food items necessary in a social context: healthcare, formal education, 
clothing, housing and public transport. Table 2 presents the incidence of poverty in the 
sample by access and willingness to participate. It also presents the poverty gap measure for 
each of the different poverty lines. The results for the impact estimations are presented in 
Table 3 and Table 4. 
Table 3 presents the results for the impact of NFS, making no distinction between both types 
of services. The estimates of the fixed effects (FE) and non-fixed effects models are 
included, though the results of the alternative Hausman-like test indicate that FE regressions 
are the most efficient estimators in every model
12
. According to these results, participation 
in NFS slightly decreases the probability of being under the asset poverty line. NFS do not 
appear to have an impact on income, nor on the alleviation of food or capabilities poverty. 
However, it is worth noting that the significance levels of a positive effect of NFS on 
income or a negative impact on the probability of being below the capabilities poverty line 
 
8
 To obtain the net income, production costs are deducted from the gross household income.  Per capita income 
is adjusted by age following the standard methodology of CONEVAL (2009). The equivalence scale is: 0.70 if 
aged 0-5; 0.74 if aged 6-12; 0.71 if aged 13-18 and 0.99 if over 18.  
9
 The use of different poverty lines constitutes a robustness check for the sensitivity of poverty to changes in 
the poverty line measure, while capturing the effects at different levels of welfare. This study does not use the 
standardized poverty lines of the World Bank as they do not present urban and rural differentiations and 
concerns exist that they might be inappropriate on a country basis.  
10
 The food poverty line is 1,043.1 and 774.7. Capabilities poverty line is 1,279.33 and 915.9. The assets 
poverty line is 2,092.8 and 1,405.8. Figures for each poverty line are for the urban and rural estimations, 
respectively. 
11
 Following the INEGI definition, rural areas comprise settlements with fewer than 2500 residents whilst in 
urban areas the population must be over 2500. 
12
 A number of observations had to be dropped from the logistic fixed effects regressions when no variation 
could be observed in the poverty status of the borrowers in the same municipality, i.e. all of them were either 
poor or non poor.  
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are close to conventional (p=0.11). The impact of NFS on monetary poverty outcomes 
appears to crucially depend on the type of poverty measure that is used.  
The covariates in the model are consistent with expectations. The ratio of dependents and 
deprivation index, both significant across all outcomes, are found to have the strongest 
association with poverty status. All the regressions were equally estimated without 
covariates and the observed effects on poverty alleviation were confirmed. The percentage 
of illiterate inhabitants of the municipality, i.e. the variable that has been chosen to account 
for municipality characteristics, is significant at the 1% level for all the non-fixed effects 
models.  
The marginal impacts of the two types of NFS are presented in Table 4. The models include 
the same covariates presented in Table 3 but different access, self-selection and treatment 
variables are specified for each type of training, BDS and PHS. The covariates are consistent 
across models, have the expected signs and share the same pattern of significance with the 
previous estimations.  
As for the treatment results of each program, presented in Table 4, though they have the 
expected signs in every case, only BDS appears to have significant impact on poverty 
alleviation. Again, the effects of attending BDS are only evident around the asset poverty 
line. Findings indicate that attending BDS decreases by 3.2 percentage points the likelihood 
of being below the asset poverty line in the municipality fixed effects estimation. These 
results are significant at 5 per cent level. Though there is significant evidence at 10 per cent 
level that participation in the BDS training increases the level of income and reduces the 
likelihood of being under the capabilities poverty line in the non-FE estimations, 
significance fades when considering unobservable municipality characteristics. No 
significant effects of participation in the PHS program could be observed, though the F-test 
that compares the two impacts indicates that there are no significant differences between the 
treatment coefficients of BDS and PHS for any model. Even if no significant impact could 
be observed for PHS, the effects of both programs seem to go in similar directions.  
The regressions presented in Table 3 and 4 have considerable explanatory power and appear 
to be correctly specified as the F, Wald and likelihood ratio tests are all significant at the 1% 
level. The post-estimation tests, conducted for the non-fixed effects models, show no 
evidence of misspecification or omitted variable bias in the models. 
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
  
6. Discussion and Policy Conclusions  
High quality demand-led non-financial services have an increasing importance in the global 
microfinance scene. These renewed credit-plus schemes, progressively perceived by 
practitioners as a comparative advantage in extremely competitive environments, continue to 
be primarily supplied for a poverty alleviation purpose. In the Mexican context, the 
transition to these added-value credit-plus services is evident. AlSol and CONSERVA, two 
of the three only MFIs currently supplying structured mature NFS and analyzed in this 
study, have adapted their credit-plus programs to this trend. These are now voluntary, 
sometimes present a cost for the borrower and their quality is usually ensured with the 
collaboration of a specialized partner.  
Using a cross sectional survey, specifically designed to prevent the endogeneity problems 
found in impact analysis, this paper analyzes the major determinants of participation in 
voluntary NFS as well as evaluating the impact of participation on poverty alleviation 
outcomes. It additionally focuses on the differences between two types of NFS programs, 
business and preventive health, in an attempt of not only understanding if credit-plus matters 
in poverty reduction but why.  
Our findings show that the participation decision depends more on borrower-related factors. 
As expected, the individual socio-economic characteristics that are found to determine 
participation tend to differ between types of NFS, which should be taken into account in the 
designing process. An interesting contribution to the literature is that the beneficiaries of the 
Oportunidades program are more likely to participate in NFS. This finding reveals 
unexplored synergies between public and private poverty alleviation programs, suggesting 
that coordinated actions between MFIs and governmental social departments might 
contribute to reach the targeted populations more efficiently and cost-effectively.  
Results show that the impact of NFS on poverty alleviation depends on the measure that is 
used. Defining poverty is crucial in any poverty alleviation study, but the choice of poverty 
outcome is to a certain extent arbitrary. For this reason, several monetary poverty measures 
have been included in this analysis. Different poverty levels can be observed among poor 
microfinance clients, each group with its particularities and its specific needs. By 
considering not only food poverty levels but also capabilities and asset poverty measures, 
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this study attempts to observe the effects of NFS on the ‘absolute’ poor and also on the 
group that, with higher income levels, is extremely vulnerable to dramatic changes in 
income or consumption, ill health, social inferiority, humiliation, shame and isolation 
(Hulme and Mosley, 1996).  
There is evidence, in this study, of significant poverty alleviation impacts of NFS around the 
asset poverty line, i.e. for the better-off clients within the sample. This is contrary to our 
expectations, because in practice NFS frequently target the poorest borrowers of the MFIs as 
these are thought to take more advantage of this type of interventions. However, our 
findings are in line with the argument that microfinance borrowers might experience higher 
impact at higher levels of income (Hulme and Mosley, 1996). NFS constitute a protective 
strategy designed to provide a safety net and act as an informal mechanism of risk insurance. 
Aiming to reduce vulnerability, these programs encourage mechanisms that prevent future 
unexpected events and cushion for them. Thus, it is those borrowers who assume higher 
risks, i.e. the less poor clients, the ones that will take further advantage of participation in 
NFS. For example, BDS will most probably not have any effect on the borrowers who are 
pretending to be operating a business in order to access the microloan. In general terms, the 
client needs to have made an investment so that NFS can be of any use. Furthermore, it 
might be the case that, particularly at lower levels of income, the positive impact of NFS on 
poverty reduction takes longer to materialize. It is highly probable that the effect of NFS is 
more intense at medium-term.  
When programs are considered separately, BDS appear to drive the observed effects on asset 
poverty reduction as no significant impact can be appreciated for PHS. There are two 
possible reasons for this. First, as it is probably the case with the clients who are below the 
food poverty line, the impact that PHS has on poverty outcomes probably takes longer to 
manifest, which is difficult to observe with this type of cross-sectional survey. In relation 
with this, the effects of PHS may start by affecting specific outcomes and take longer to 
translate into poverty alleviation effects. Gaining a further insight on what are the 
mechanisms through which NFS reduce poverty is relevant for all the stakeholders in the 
microfinance industry. 

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Table 1. Probit Estimation of the Participation Determinants in NFS
Independent variables NFS BDS PHS 
(I )Full 
sample  
(II) No 
access 
(III)Full 
sample 
(IV) No 
access 
(V) Full 
simple 
(VI) No 
access 
Age 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.04**
(0.02) 
0.10***
(0.03) 
Age squared -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00  
(0.00) 
-0.00**
(0.00) 
-0.00***
(0.00) 
Education years (log) 0.04 
(0.04) 
0.23***
(0.07) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
0.11**
(0.06) 
0.25***
(0.08) 
Rural area -0.01 
(0.06) 
0.24***
(0.08) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
0.23
(0.16) 
-0.03 
(0.13) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
Indigenous a 0.09 
(0.07) 
0.26 ***
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.11 
(0.15) 
- - 
Cohabit 0.09 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.19) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
Household head 0.12**
(0.05) 
0.11 
(0.11)   
0.21***
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.20) 
0.00   
(0.10) 
-0.23 
(0.24) 
Ratio of dependents -0.05 
(0.11) 
0.10 
(0.21) 
-0.25 
(0.18) 
-0.19   
(0.35) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
 0.04 
(0.23) 
Empowerment b 0.03**  
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03*
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
Oportunidades 0.15***
(0.05) 
0.21***
(0.08) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.22 *
(0.13) 
0.15**
(0.07) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
Human capital of working 
members 
-0.01***
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.01***
(0.00) 
-0.01*
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
Female workers human capital 
as % of total 
-0.58***
(0.20) 
-0.70 **
(0.36) 
-0.99***
(0.27)   
0.39  
(1.39) 
0.03   
(0.28) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
Own house -0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.19 ***
(0.08) 
  0.18**
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.21) 
-0.22***
(0.06) 
-0.28***
(0.08) 
Own land -0.04 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.15) 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
0.09 
(0.21) 
0.00 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.15) 
Deprivation index c -0.06**
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.07 *
(0.04) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.06 *
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
Loan size (log) 0.04  
(0.03) 
-0.06  
(0.08)  
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.13) 
0.05    
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
Prior real monthly income 
(log) d
- - - - 
0.02 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
Months of business (log) 0.02  
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.07)   
-0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.01**
(0.03) 
Business experience -0.05  
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.14) 
0 .04 
(0.07) 
0.16 
(0.10) 
Distance to training (log 
minutes) 
-0.01  
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
-0.02  
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
Cost 0.11  
(0.10) 
0.38***
(0.15) 
- - - - 
Observations 
Wald 2
Pseudo R2  
Prob > 2
434 
53.81*** 
0.097 
0.273 
134 
35.10*** 
0.208 
0.196 
218 
55.01***
0.193 
0.286 
70 
29.56**
0.308 
0.110 
216 
36.63***
0.152 
0.152 
64 
34.11*** 
0.394 
0.149
Significant at the: *** 1 per cent level; ** 5 per cent level; * 10 per cent level. Marginal effects are reported here. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
a/ Only for AlSol 
b/ Empowerment indicates the decision making power of the client in the household in the following areas: major 
consumption expenditure, own health, business, credit and bill payment. Scale ranging from zero to ten, a higher number is 
associated with more decision making power of the borrower.  
c/ Deprivation index, based on Maldonado and Gonzalez Vega (2008), indicates the level of deprivation by aggregating the 
areas in which the client is deprived: house quality, health services and basic services (CONEVAL, 2009). A higher 
number is associated with more deprivation.  
d/ Only for CONSERVA. 
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Table 2: Incidence of Poverty by Group
Mean figures are given in percentages. Poverty lines are derived using income per adult equivalent.  
Sources: CONEVAL (2009), OECD (2010) and sample survey. 
Concept 
 Mean by group 
 Access No access 
Mean S.D. Interest No interest Interest No interest 
WB poverty US$1.25 a day 2.53 0.16 1.02 7.69 0 2.56 
Food poverty (P1)      
Headcount (P10) 35.71 0.48 38.46 37.75 29.47 33.33 
Poverty gap rate (P11) 11.75 0.20 11.51 14.64 8.55 13.01 
Capabilities poverty (P2)      
Headcount (P21) 45.85 0.50 43.88 51.92 44.21 43.59 
Poverty gap rate (P22) 16.94 0.23 16.75 20.33 13.52 17.21 
Assets poverty (P3)      
Headcount (P31) 69.35 0.46 68.37 75.96 66.31 64.10 
Poverty gap rate (P32) 32.65 0.29 32.25 37.27 29.14 30.87 
Observations (number) 434 196 104 95 39 
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Appendix 1: Characteristics of Non-Financial Services 
AlSol 
Partner: Freedom from Hunger
Description: 
Business training organized in modules, each consisting of 8 sessions of 30 minutes, 
delivered during the credit meetings.
Enrolment Status: Voluntary
Price: Free
Training materials:  
Module 1: Manage your Business Money Module 2: Plan for a Better Business
1. Separate business and personal money 
2. Use the business loans for the business 
3. Calculate profits 
4. Control, plan and invest business 
money 
5. Use the business profit for business and 
personal needs 
6. Prevent business losses  
7. Manage credit sales 
8. Review session 
1. Use the eight planning steps for 
business development 
2. Analyze the business demand 
3. Problem identification and solving 
4. Techniques to implement new business 
ideas 
5. Plan how much to produce and sell 
6. Plan the business costs 
7. Plan ways to increase profits 
8. Identify new funding sources for the 
business 
9. Prepare for unexpected events 
CONSERVA
Partner: GEMA A.C.; Private local clinics; UNACH
Description: 
Full day of activities: workshop on women’s reproductive health (60-90 minutes), cervical 
cancer screening and colposcopy exam if needed, private explanation of the results by 
GEMA staff. Patients are entitled to three subsidized medical visits.
Enrolment Status: Voluntary
Price: 100 MXP (8 USD) 
Training materials:
Workshop 1: 
1. Introduction on the female reproductive system 
2. Sexually transmitted diseases: Concept, symptoms and prevention 
3. Cervical cancer: Concept, symptoms and prevention 
4. Human papilloma virus (HPV): Concept, symptoms and prevention (health exams) 
5. Treatments 
6. Question time 
Health Exams and Treatments
1. Cancer screening 
2. Colposcopy 
3. Cold coagulation treatment 
4. Laser ablation treatment 
5. Loop diathermy treatment 
Individual Counseling



Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Square brackets denote the number of observations for which the natural 
logarithm of prior real monthly income is available.  
a/ b/ Defined identically to Table 1. 
Variables 
 Mean by group 
 Access No access 
Mean S.D. Interest 
No 
interest
Interest 
No 
interest 
Age 
38.69 12.74
39.26 
(11.76) 
38.59 
(13.92)
39.05 
(13.42) 
35.18 
(12.41) 
Education years (log) 
1.37 0.91
1.36 
(0.89) 
1.45 
(0.95)
1.34 
(0.88) 
1.22 
(0.99) 
Indigenous 
0.34 0.48
0.36 
0.48) 
0.38 
(0.49)
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
Cohabit 
0.80 0.40
0.82 
0.39) 
0.78 
(0.42)
0.80 
(0.40) 
0.79 
(0.41) 
Household head 
0.36 0.48
0.46 
(0.50) 
0.32 
(0.47)
0.27 
(0.45) 
0.18 
(0.39) 
Ratio of dependents 
0.39 0.24
0.41 
(0.23) 
0.37 
(0.25)
0.37 
(0.23) 
0.41 
(0.25) 
Empowerment index a/
5.32 2.34
5.59 
(2.30) 
4.74 
(2.49)
5.60 
(2.25) 
4.87 
(2.09) 
Oportunidades 
0.41 0.49
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.35 
(0.48)
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.31 
(0.47) 
Human capital of working 
members 15.09 11.29
13.80 
(9.95) 
17.46 
(12.21)
14.91 
(11.39) 
15.72 
(14.00) 
Female workers human 
capital as % of total 0.05 0.12
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.16)
0.04 
(0.07) 
0.05 
(0.16) 
Own house 
0.76 0.42
0.78 
(0.41) 
0.78 
(0.42)
0.68 
(0.47) 
0.82 
(0.39) 
Own land 
0.20 0.40
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.29 
(0.45)
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
Deprivation index b/
1.08 0.95
1.14 
(0.98) 
1.37 
(0.87)
0.70 
(0.88) 
0.92 
(0.87) 
Loan size (log) 
8.48 0.76
8.56 
(0.85) 
8.38 
(0.77)
8.44 
(0.58) 
8.49 
(0.63) 
Prior real monthly income 
(log) 8.69 0.78
8.91 
(0.82) 
8.76 
(0.77)
8.30 
(0.54) 
8.32 
(0.54) 
Months of business (log) 
3.42 1.47
3.63 
(1.31) 
3.36 
(1.51)
3.15 
(1.66) 
3.18 
(1.52) 
Business experience 
0.51 0.50
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.58 
(0.50)
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.41 
(0.50) 
Distance to training (log 
minutes) 2.68 1.41
2.71 
(1.51) 
2.84 
(1.20)
2.58 
(1.36) 
2.27 
(1.42) 
Rural area 0.25 0.43
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.33 
(0.47)
0.22 
(0.42) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
Municipality illiteracy 
rate (%) 
22.78 13.62
23.77 
(14.46) 
23.43 
(13.75)
20.13 
(12.03) 
22.60 
(12.08) 
Observations (number) 
434  
[216] 
196 
[100] 
104 
[52] 
95 
[49] 
39 
[15] 

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